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Abstract 
 
Recent penal policy developments in England and Wales emphasise the role for voluntary 
organisations. Voluntary organisations play an important and increasing role in 
punishment, including imprisonment and supervision, but the effects of their work are ill 
understood. Existing literature is ambivalent: some argue such work empowers and builds 
social capital; for others, it extends control. This tension is addressed by analysing two 
payment by results pilot schemes. This analysis adds to the limited empirical knowledge 
about voluntary organisations. It  demonstrates how their involvement in these pilots 
enabled and justified the new 12 month mandatory statutory supervision requirement, 
significantly extending the spatial and temporal reach of carceral power. The conclusion 
considers the theoretical implications of this analysis.  
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Introduction 
 
“There can hardly be a prison in the country that could continue to work as it does if there was a large 
scale collapse of voluntary, community and social enterprise services for people in custody” (Martin, 
2013: no pagination; see also Neuberger, 2009; Armstrong, 2002). 
 
The voluntary sector's impact upon punishment in England and Wales is considered very 
significant, and is likely to expand. But whilst an ongoing “lively debate” surrounds 
private sector involvement in punishment, the work of voluntary organisations has gone 
“largely unnoticed” by scholars (Armstrong, 2002: 345). Recent policy developments have 
emphasised the role for voluntary/charitable organisations1 in the market for penal 
services as part of broad packages of reform. For example, Breaking the Cycle Green Paper 
(Ministry of Justice/MoJ, 2010) and Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform (MoJ, 
2013c) stressed the role for voluntary organisations in payment by results (PbR) 
contracting2. These policy developments have increased the urgency of better 
understanding the impact of voluntary organisations upon punishment.  
 
Although the value and contribution of voluntary organisations has been widely 
acknowledged (e.g. Corcoran and Hucklesby, 2013; Maguire, 2012; Mills et al., 2012; 
Benson and Hedge, 2009), the effects of their work are not clear. Existing literature 
presents a tension. For some, voluntary organisations empower prisoners and 
probationers, enabling them to build social capital (e.g. Bilby et al., 2013; Cohen, 2009; 
Lewis et al., 2007; Lippke, 2003). For others, the 'benevolent' work of voluntary 
organisations extends control, increases the scale of penality, and shores up coercive 
carceral regimes (e.g. Cox, 2013; Armstrong, 2002; Cohen, 1985; McWilliams, 1983; 
                                                 
1 I use the labels 'voluntary sector' and 'voluntary organisations'. An array of terminologies are used to refer to 
organisations in this area, including third sector; nonprofit; nongovernmental; charitable; civil society; 
philanthropic; and community organisations (Goddard, 2012; Alcock and Scott, 2007; Armstrong, 2002).  
2 PbR links the contractor's payment to results achieved, to encourage greater efficiency and effectiveness in service 
delivery (Maguire, 2012). PbR offers potential reductions in state expenditure and transfers risks away from the state 
to commercial investors (Whitehead, 2015: see p. 293 for a full explanation of relevant literature).  
3 
Ignatieff, 1978; Foucault, 1977).  
 
I address this tension and contribute towards better understanding how the work of 
voluntary organisations affects prisoners and probationers, by analysing voluntary sector 
involvement in a translation3 of ideas from policy rhetoric into national practice. 
Translation illustrates how the process of relationship building succeeds or fails and how 
actors impose their definitions of a situation upon other actors (Gray et al., 2009; Callon, 
1986). This translation began with the Breaking the Cycle Green Paper (MoJ, 2010), and 
culminated in the enactment of the 12 month mandatory statutory supervision 
requirement (hereafter 'supervision requirement') through the Offender Rehabilitation Act 
2014. This translation encompassed the prison-based PbR pilot schemes at HMPs 
Peterborough and Doncaster and the publication of Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy 
for Reform (MoJ, 2013c). Although the PbR pilots initially emphasised voluntary 
participation, rehabilitation and resettlement, I argue that they directly enabled the 
supervision requirement for all prisoners sentenced to less than 12 months in custody4. 
Extending post-release supervision to these prisoners “for the first time in recent history” 
(MoJ, 2013c: 6) is predicted to result in 13,000 additional offenders being recalled to 
custody annually and cost £16 million (Prison Reform Trust, 2013: 1). This analysis 
demonstrates how the involvement of certain voluntary organisations and a discursive 
voluntary sector in this translation enabled and justified the supervision requirement, and 
associated extensions in the spatial and temporal reach of carceral power. 
 
I draw on data collected through document analysis of policy and voluntary organisation 
publications, which formed part of a larger research project conceptualising the penal 
voluntary sector in England and Wales. To map the translation, policy publications that 
                                                 
3 This analysis was informed by actor-network theory's four-phase process of translation. This methodology is not 
discussed here for reasons of space, but details can be found in Gray et al., 2009 and Callon, 1986.  
4 The supervision requirement has similarities to 'Custody Plus', a flagship of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 'Custody 
Plus' involved a licence period of up to 26 weeks for short sentence prisoners with requirements aimed at reducing 
reoffending, but was never actually brought in due to concerns about inadequate resourcing and the potential for the 
system to become overwhelmed (Ashworth, 2010: 295).  
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followed Breaking the Cycle were analysed (MoJ, 2011a; MoJ, 2011b; MoJ, 2012a; MoJ, 2013a; 
MoJ, 2013b; MoJ, 2013c; MoJ, 2015a; MoJ, 2015b), along with the voluntary organisation 
responses to crucial stages of the translation (Howard League, 2013; Prison Reform Trust, 
2013; Howard League, 2011; Nacro, 2011; Social Finance, 2011; St Giles Trust, 2011). First, 
the penal voluntary sector is defined. Policy reforms are then introduced and the four 
phases of their translation are examined. The effects of this translation are discussed and 
the theoretical implications of this analysis explored.  
 
The penal voluntary sector 
 
This analysis is situated in the penal and policy context of England and Wales. Although 
there are important differences between territories, the voluntary sector and the 
marketisation of penal services are issues of international import. This discussion is thus 
particularly relevant to Canada, the USA and Australia, which have similar penal policy 
developments involving the voluntary sector (Ilcan and Basok, 2004; Armstrong, 2002; 
Wallis, 2001). Diverse voluntary organisations play an important and increasing role in the 
operation of imprisonment and supervision (e.g. Martin, 2013; Neuberger, 2009; 
Armstrong, 2002), but understandings of the penal voluntary sector are still “lacking” 
(Mills et al., 2011: 195), due to the “limited attention devoted to charitable organisations” 
by scholars (Armstrong, 2002: 345). There is a relative dearth of voluntary sector research 
in punishment, compared to housing and social care scholarship (Corcoran, 2011: 33). The 
penal voluntary sector therefore remains “a descriptive rather than theoretically rigorous 
concept or empirically defined entity” (Corcoran, 2011: 33).  
 
Penal voluntary organisations are “charitable and self-defined voluntary agencies working 
with prisoners and offenders in prison- and community-based programmes” (Corcoran, 
2011: 33). The 'voluntary' or 'charitable' descriptor is very powerful, but encompasses 
“extremely diverse organisations” (Armstrong, 2002: 356; see also Tomczak, 2014). The 
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organisations comprising the penal voluntary sector vary enormously in terms of income 
ranges, funding sources, proportions of volunteer and paid staff, working styles and 
objectives. Voluntary organisations do not make profits for shareholders (Maguire, 2012; 
Kendall and Deakin, 2010), although this distinction has been sullied by recent 
involvement of voluntary organisations in penal service delivery contracts and 
partnerships with private companies (Neilson, 2009; Alcock and Scott, 2007).   
 
Voluntary organisations are assumed to have a distinctive ethics of compassion, 
rehabilitative approach, ability to engage (ex-)offenders, and focus on the needs and socio-
economic integration of individuals (Goddard, 2012; Maguire, 2012; Mills et al., 2012; 
Corcoran, 2011; Meek et al, 2010; Brookman and Holloway, 2008; Lewis et al., 2007; Light, 
1993). Although the idea of voluntary action exerts a powerful hold over penal policy 
reform movements and evokes a “richly positive imagery” of inclusion (Armstrong, 2002: 
351; see also Crawford, 1999), there remains surprisingly little evidence demonstrating 
exactly how or if a penal voluntary organisation “is different than a for-profit business or a 
state agency” when dealing with prisoners and probationers (Armstrong, 2002: 346, 
emphasis in original).  
 
Policy reforms 
 
The policy translation analysed here, which ran from Breaking the Cycle to the Offender 
Rehabilitation Act 2014, is not entirely discrete. The Conservative Thatcher government 
introduced neoliberal policies in the 1980s and 90s, which privatised public services by 
creating competitive service delivery markets (Maguire, 2012; Corcoran, 2011; Ryan, 2011). 
Whilst part of this broader neoliberal project, Breaking the Cycle initiated significant penal 
policy reforms and introduced the PbR contract mechanism. Breaking the Cycle emphasised 
failings of the penal system and set out government proposals to create a “rehabilitation 
revolution” in punishment (MoJ, 2010: 1), ostensibly demanding that penal services be 
further decentralised and marketised through PbR. Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy 
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for Reform also stressed that the market in penal services will be further opened up to 
public, private and voluntary sector providers, and assigned a central role to PbR as a 
means of improving competition, performance and effectiveness (MoJ, 2013c).  
 
The foci of this paper are the prison PbR pilots and supervision requirement, but the 
Transforming Rehabilitation programme included further reforms. It created resettlement 
prisons for prisoners nearing release, established the public National Probation Service for 
high risk (ex-)offenders, and privatised probation supervision for medium and low risk 
(ex-)offenders by founding Community Rehabilitation Companies (MoJ, 2013c). The 
probation reforms also followed MoJ consultations on community sentences and 
probation (MoJ, 2012b; MoJ, 2012c), and voluntary organisations feature in almost all of 
the partnerships owning Community Rehabilitation Companies (which are partially 
remunerated via PbR). Elements of this analysis therefore apply to those developments.  
 
The translation of Breaking the Cycle was principally a top-down initiative, operating from 
macro-scale national policy networks to affect organisation at a smaller scale. Each 
member of the penal system (including voluntary organisations) is actively involved in 
translating thought and action; giving rise to struggles, accommodations, alliances and 
separations (Carrabine, 2000). This paper considers how voluntary organisations affected 
and opposed certain developments and resisted the expansion of carceral control. 
However, it illustrates the critical role of voluntary organisations in extending the 
regulatory power of the penal apparatus by translating policies suggesting a significant 
expansion of carceral power into practice (cf. Carrabine, 2000). The next section details the 
first phase of this translation, in which the MoJ published Breaking the Cycle, identified a 
penal problem and specified how and with whom it was to be addressed.  
 
Four Phases of Translation 
Identifying a problem, a solution and the actors involved 
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In Breaking the Cycle (published 7th December 2010), the MoJ defined and identified a 
problem (high rates of recidivism following release from prison) and a particular solution 
(using the PbR mechanism to pay penal service contractors). They also identified the 
actors involved (discursively and practically) in the resolution. The MoJ defined 
punishment's failings as shared problems, concerning everyone interested in creating a 
safe society. Within the context of drawing “on the expertise of everyone who can make a 
contribution” to the rehabilitation revolution (MoJ, 2010: 5), there were numerous specific 
references to the voluntary sector's role (e.g. MoJ, 2010: 10, 14, 15, 25, 27, 31, 35, 38, 41). 
 
The key problem was high rates of recidivism, meaning “most criminals continue to 
commit more crimes against more victims once they are released back onto the streets”; 
notwithstanding high penal spending: “despite a 50% increase in the budget for prisons 
and managing offenders in the last ten years almost half of all adult offenders released 
from custody reoffend within a year” (MoJ, 2010: 1). The MoJ characterised the penal 
system as “an expensive way of giving the public a break from offenders, before they 
return to commit more crimes” (2010: 1).  
 
High recidivism was presented as a shared problem throughout society, threatening the 
“safety and security of the law-abiding citizen” who “has a right to feel safe in their home 
and their community” (MoJ, 2010: 1). The apparent long-term threat caused by young 
offenders was also highlighted: “if we do not prevent and tackle offending by young 
people then the young offenders of today will become the prolific career criminals of 
tomorrow” (MoJ, 2010: 1). The MoJ connected these problems to the economic recession, 
stating the imperative to reduce the costs of punishment and emphasising their 
organisational commitment to “playing its part in reducing spending to return the country 
to economic growth” (2010: 8). By stressing the immediate and long-term negative effects 
of recidivism, Breaking the Cycle explained the problem of the expensive and failing penal 
system evocatively, so interested groups could relate, and presented a normative solution.  
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Specific measures were proposed to resolve this shared problem and ostensibly benefit 
citizens throughout society, but the practices of imprisonment and probation were not 
critiqued. The predicament of high spending yet enduring recidivism was explained by 
one failing of penal policy and practice: “the lack of a firm focus on reform and 
rehabilitation” (MoJ, 2010: 1). As such, “significant amounts of money have been spent […] 
without properly holding providers to account for results” (MoJ, 2010: 38). PbR was 
identified as the solution to recidivism, as its firm focus on outcomes apparently 
incentivises all service providers to innovate and improve effectiveness at “reducing 
reoffending” (MoJ, 2010: 10, see also 6, 12, 38). The principle of decentralisation was also 
emphasised, moving “away from centrally controlled services dominated by the public 
sector, towards a more competitive system that draws on the knowledge, expertise and 
innovation of a much broader set of organisations from all sectors” (MoJ, 2010: 8). 
 
These proposals were presented as “a fundamental break with the failed and expensive 
policies of the past” through the new focus on discovering “what works – the methods of 
punishment and rehabilitation which actually reduce crime by reducing the number of 
criminals” (MoJ, 2010: 2). As such, Breaking the Cycle provided “a once in a generation 
opportunity for providers from all sectors to work together to make a real difference” to 
punishment, safety and economic recovery (MoJ, 2010: 9). This rehabilitation revolution 
promised to “change those communities whose lives are made a misery by crime” (MoJ, 
2010: 6). To achieve this, improve safety and generate “savings to the taxpayer” (MoJ, 2010: 
1), the MoJ called on the “skills of the private sector and civil society” (2010: 2) to provide 
“new rehabilitation programmes, delivered on a payment by results basis” (MoJ, 2010: 1).  
 
Breaking the Cycle described a new mechanism through which public sector organisations, 
the private sector and civil society should “compete in new markets” (MoJ, 2010: 2) to 
improve public safety and reduce the economic burden of punishment. It defined the 
identities of interested stakeholders, i.e. penal service providers from all sectors with the 
skills to enhance prisoner and probationer rehabilitation, who share the concerns of 
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improving public safety and stimulating economic recovery. Notably, the MoJ was 
constructed as a powerful macro-actor, indispensable to other interested actors. 
Competitive commissioning of penal services through the PbR mechanism is essential to 
achieve the mutually desirable outcomes of improved public safety and economic growth. 
Such commissioning must be routed through MoJ procurement processes. Breaking the 
Cycle defined a set of shared problems and solutions, and specified the roles of interested 
actors. But these solutions and roles were not yet accepted nor adopted by interested 
actors. The MoJ invited feedback on its proposals: “we want to hear your views on the 
benefits and challenges posed by implementing them” (2010: 13). This consultation 
process constituted the second phase of the policy translation, which is now examined.  
 
Submission and rejection  
 
Seeking feedback on the proposals and stimulating responses from a range of interested 
organisations worked to standardise the identities of interested actors in the translation, 
which the MoJ had defined in Breaking the Cycle. A range of interested actors defined their 
positions by publishing formal responses, including: G4S (G4S, 2011), the Church of 
England (Mission and Public Affairs Council of the Church of England, 2011), and the 
Judiciary of England and Wales (Thomas and Goldring, 2011). At least 28 voluntary 
organisations published individual responses, e.g. Action for Prisoners' Families (2011) 
and the Howard League for Penal Reform (2011). In addition, Clinks (the umbrella 
organisation for penal voluntary organisations) consulted with their members and 
produced a collective response informed by over 500 professionals working in punishment 
(2011). These responses demonstrated that Breaking the Cycle engaged the professional 
curiosity of numerous voluntary organisations that invested the time and resources 
required to consider its proposals and write responses. However, the vast majority of 
voluntary organisations did not respond5. Their silence may indicate that many do not 
have relationships with the MoJ and engage with smaller statutory agencies, were not 
                                                 
5  In 2005, an estimated 1,500 voluntary organisations were working with prisons and probation (Meek et al., 2010: 3) 
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interested by the proposals, did not have the resources to respond, or chose not to use 
their resources thus.  
 
The voluntary organisations Nacro and St Giles Trust used their consultation responses to 
broadly welcome the proposals, supporting the premise that voluntary organisations 
should participate in competitive penal service markets. The Howard League rejected the 
proposals and defined its interests differently. Nacro stated that Breaking the Cycle “offers a 
real opportunity for positive reform”, commending the victim focus and PbR's emphasis 
on outcomes (Nacro, 2011: 2). Similarly, St Giles Trust recommended outsourcing prison 
and probation services “to specialist voluntary and community sector agencies” to deliver 
effective outcomes at less cost (St Giles Trust, 2011: no pagination).  
 
Conversely, the Howard League expressed dissidence and questioned multiple proposals, 
arguing that “criminal justice, and imprisonment in particular, is a blunt tool which cannot 
in itself provide lasting solutions to the problem of crime” (Howard League, 2011: 4). They 
stressed that “the underlying causes of local crime are best tackled through investment in 
public services beyond the criminal justice system, be it health, education or welfare” 
(Howard League, 2011: 41; see also Prison Reform Trust, 2011). They voiced “serious 
reservations about the payment by results proposals”, pointing out that PbR has “no track 
record of success” and could create “inefficiencies” due to its complexity (Howard League, 
2011: 17). They stressed that PbR could see providers “cherry-picking” offenders who are 
most likely to provide the desired 'results', at the expense of engaging with “those who 
present the most need” (Howard League, 2011: 18). The Howard League thus challenged 
the very premise of the proposals, arguing that a firm focus on reform and rehabilitation 
within the penal system as currently constituted is not a mechanism that can stimulate a 
rehabilitation revolution. They also questioned the effectiveness and utility of PbR, which 
was an essential technique in Breaking the Cycle, ensuring service providers focus on 
outcomes and rehabilitation.  
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Following this consultation, the MoJ published Breaking the Cycle: Government Response, 
foregrounding how the consultation enabled interested actors to consider “opportunities 
and risks presented by the proposed reforms” (2011b: 3). The response explained that that 
the consultation lasted twelve weeks, receiving over 1,200 written responses and feedback 
from events run “across the country” (MoJ, 2011b: 3). The contributions helped the MoJ 
“set a more intelligent course for delivering effective punishment and reducing 
reoffending in England and Wales” (2011b: 2). However, whilst there were multiple 
strands of the consultation, it is difficult to see how dissidence was taken into account. 
Regarding PbR, the MoJ response underscored that PbR “will underpin all our work on 
reoffending”, stating: “we are clear that we want to rapidly build on these pilots” (2011b: 
7). There was neither acknowledgement of nor engagement with criticisms of this 
mechanism6. The impact of dissidence on MoJ consultations is further explored below. The 
next section considers the third phase of translation, during which the MoJ formally 
enrolled actors into its proposals and experimented with PbR through pilot schemes.    
 
Experimentation and Enrollment 
 
The first PbR pilot at Category B HMP Peterborough was significant in Breaking the Cycle. 
Contracts were signed in March 2010, and it launched in September 2010 (MoJ, 2011a: 1, 3). 
This pilot affected 3,000 male, short-sentence prisoners inside HMP Peterborough and 
following release, entailing prisoner mentoring and linking to services addressing 
offending behaviour (MoJ, 2012a: 2). Qualifying prisoners were at least 18 years old when 
sentenced for a consecutive period under 365 days (MoJ, 2011a: 34). The aim was to reduce 
                                                 
6 See also, for example: the Prison Reform Trust's recommendation to abolish the mandatory minimum sentence for 
murder (2011: 5) and MoJ statement “mandatory life sentences for murder are an essential part of the sentencing 
framework” (2011b:10); the Prison Reform Trust's emphasis upon drastically reducing short prison sentences given 
their poor track record in reducing reoffending (2011: 4; see also Howard League, 2011: 8) and MoJ statements “we 
are not aiming to cut the prison population” (2011b: 2), “we will not push for community sentences to be used 
instead of prison” (2011b: 4); the Howard League's warning of “danger in making community sentences 'tougher' 
[…] we must not shift community sentences too much towards punitive objectives for risk of repeating mistakes of 
the past” (2011: 10) and MoJ statement “non-custodial sentences need to be tough and demanding […] we will also 
consider further changes to the system, including ways in which we can use the market, and payment by results, to 
deliver more and tougher requirements” (2011b: 4).  
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short-sentence reconviction rates, from 60% within a year of release (MoJ, 2011a: 3; Social 
Finance, 2011).  
 
This formed the world's first trial Social Impact Bond and PbR pilot, with investment 
funding obtained upfront from non-governmental investors for an intervention to improve 
social outcomes (MoJ, 2011a: 1,3). The non-governmental financial intermediary Social 
Finance raised £5 million from 17 social investors, “mostly charitable trusts and 
foundations” (Social Finance, 2011: no pagination; MoJ, 2011a: 3).  A key attraction for 
investors was the pilot's “alignment with a charitable interest in criminal justice and 
offender rehabilitation” (MoJ, 2011a: ii). This investment offered dual benefits: making a 
social impact and generating financial returns, but all capital was at risk if outcomes did 
not improve (Social Finance, 2011).  
 
'Outcomes' referred to the reconviction rates of the pilot group in the 18 months following 
release from custody, compared to reconviction rates for the matched control group of 
prisoners (MoJ, 2011a; see also Cave et al., 2012). The MoJ and the Big Lottery Fund would 
make an outcome payment if reconviction rates reduced by: a) 7.5% or more across all 
3,000 prisoners; or b) 10% or more in all three cohorts of prisoners7 (MoJ, 2011a: 33-34; 
Social Finance, 2011). These thresholds were calculated by the MoJ’s analytical team to 
reflect statistical levels at which improved outcomes had not occurred by chance (MoJ, 
2011a: 33-34, 37). If successful, investors would receive increasing financial returns on their 
investment of up to 13% per year over eight years (Social Finance, 2011).  
 
The financial intermediary Social Finance (not the MoJ) enrolled charitable actors as 
investors and service providers in this pilot, before Breaking the Cycle was published. 
Charitable trusts and foundations “largely” provided the £5 million investment funding 
for the pilot, including the Esmee Fairburn Foundation and Lankelly Chase (MoJ, 2011a: ii, 
                                                 
7  The first cohort would close upon the scheme reaching two years of operation or discharging 1,000 prisoners (MoJ, 
2011a: 33). 
13 
5). Three charities were enrolled as service providers to practically support prisoner 
resettlement: St Giles Trust, Ormiston Children and Families Trust and the YMCA. St Giles 
Trust was the principal service provider, with other providers appointed on an as-needs 
basis (MoJ, 2011a: 17). St Giles work only with (ex-)offenders, but Ormiston and the YMCA 
have a broader remit. St Giles supported prisoners inside, at the gate and following 
release; Ormiston supported prisoners’ families during imprisonment and post-release; 
and the YMCA supplied a community base for prisoners post-release (Social Finance, 
2011). This work fed the pilot’s aim of supporting resettlement and reducing recidivism.  
 
PbR pilots and the specific Peterborough pilot were critical in Breaking the Cycle (e.g. MoJ, 
2010: 1, 10, 11). But the Peterborough pilot was not a 'typical' PbR scheme for three 
reasons. First, it was instigated by the non-governmental financial intermediary Social 
Finance, which approached civil servants with the concept (MoJ, 2011a: 10). Although the 
pilot was not sponsored by the MoJ, it was subsequently incorporated into their 
translation. The pilot proceeded under a nove, commissioning relationship, where the MoJ 
did not contract with service providers, maintained no control over their selection and had 
no direct relationship with them (MoJ, 2011a: iii). These tasks were delegated to Social 
Finance, which would not usually occur (MoJ, 2011a: iii, see also 15). Second, the scheme 
targeted short-sentence prisoners serving custodial terms of under twelve months, for 
whom there was usually no probation supervision following release (unless they were 
under 21 years old) (MoJ, 2011a: 10). This pilot was therefore an expansion, delivering 
services not part of existing statutory service provision. Third, the contract between Social 
Finance and the MoJ was not procured through the usual goverment tendering process to 
ensure fiscal competiveness (MoJ, 2011a: 14). Social Finance's proposal was considered 
“worth testing” and had support from a high level in the MoJ (MoJ, 2011a: 14). These three 
unusual conditions significantly affect the suitability of this pilot to test PbR across prison 
and probation service delivery.  
 
The complex dynamic between actors in this pilot involved six contractual relationships 
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(MoJ, 2011a: 13, 15) that stabilised actors' identities and commitments. The MoJ had three 
contracts, with: Social Finance (who operated the pilot and secured investment), 
Peterborough Prison Management Limited (the consortium contracted for HMP 
Peterborough, with operation subcontracted to the private company Sodexo), and the 
independent results assessors (QinetiQ and the University of Leicester) (MoJ, 2011a: 3, 13, 
17). Social Finance8 had three contracts, with: their financial investors, charitable service 
providers, and the Big Lottery Fund (which invested in the pilot and would pay an 
outcome return alongside the MoJ) (MoJ, 2011a: 17).  
 
Although the Peterborough pilot appears relatively independent, the MoJ significantly 
influenced its terms at every stage. Social Finance identified the shared concerns of 
financial returns and social impact and approached the MoJ with this idea. But the MoJ 
was involved from a very early stage, affecting the terms of the pilot, its location and the 
investors.  Social Finance initially focussed on short-sentence prisoners discharged in 
Cambridgeshire (MoJ, 2011a: 36). However, this group proved too small to be statistically 
significant, so did not meet the MoJ analytical team's requirements (MoJ, 2011a: 36). 
Negotiations between the MoJ and Social Finance followed (MoJ, 2011a: 36), but the MoJ's 
requirement of statistical significance proved critical. Social Finance made a confidentiality 
agreement with the MoJ before identifying and shortlisting potential investors, who were 
subsequently reviewed by the MoJ (MoJ, 2011a: 17). The next section explores how the MoJ 
was involved in determining and reporting the pilot results. 
 
Further non state actors were enrolled into Breaking the Cycle's proposals following 
publication. Subsequent PbR pilots included the Heron Unit/ Project Daedalus in HMP 
Feltham, London9, and a resettlement pilot at the Serco-managed Category B HMP 
Doncaster (MoJ, 2012a: 1). The Doncaster pilot was provided by an 'alliance' of service 
                                                 
8 Social Finance set up a limited partnership called 'The Social Impact Partnership' to operate the pilot scheme. Here 
the nomenclature 'Social Finance' is used to maintain clarity of expression (MoJ, 2011a: 13). 
9 For full details of this and other PbR models, see Independent Commission on Youth Crime and Antisocial 
Behaviour, 2011: 19. 
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providers, comprising the private company Serco and voluntary organisations Catch 22 
and Turning Point. The contract was signed in April 2011, and the pilot commenced in 
October 2011 (MoJ, 2012a: 3). It operated within Breaking the Cycle's context, embracing 
PbR and addressing reoffending (MoJ, 2012a: 2).  
 
Serco's contract to operate HMP Doncaster expired in July 2011 (MoJ, 2012a: 3). Serco's 
successful bid proposed a PbR pilot scheme for prisoners approaching discharge, aiming 
“to test the impact of replacing a multitude of process and output targets and performance 
monitoring with a single outcome-based target (to reduce the reconviction rate) with a 
strong financial incentive to achieve this” (MoJ, 2012a: 3). Although initially intended for 
all prisoners, the target group was reduced to short-sentence prisoners during the early 
stages of implementation (MoJ, 2013a: ii). The rationale was explained only as: “providing 
intensive case management in custody for all offenders was not the most efficient or 
appropriate use of resources” (MoJ, 2013a: ii).  
 
The Doncaster pilot demonstrates the MoJ's successful enrollment of the 'alliance' into 
Breaking the Cycle's proposals. The 'alliance' of private and voluntary sector service 
providers also subsequently targeted short-sentence prisoners, mirroring the 
Peterborough pilot and laying the foundations for enacting the supervision requirement. 
The next section examines how the MoJ became the principal spokesperson for the 
heterogeneous actors involved in these pilots, ultimately mobilising their inputs to 
translate PbR and the supervision requirement from policy rhetoric into practice. 
 
Results Spokesperson 
 
The MoJ became the dominant spokesperson in this translation, reporting for all actors 
who responded to the consultation and participated in the PbR pilots. This group included 
some voluntary organisations in practice (as named above) and drew on a discursive 
'voluntary sector' of service providers. The spokesperson is a powerful macro-actor that 
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can mobilise the interests, roles and relations of entire networks (Callon and Latour, 1981). 
By defining a problem and solutions, deciding on outcome measures, signing contracts 
and generating results, the MoJ generated a series of intermediaries and equivalences (cf. 
Callon, 1986; Callon and Latour, 1981) that designated it the dominant spokesperson for all 
actors in the translation. By publishing proposals, running consultations, collating 
responses and running PbR pilots, the MoJ took primary responsibility for determining 
and publishing their results. The MoJ then mobilised and accumulated the inputs of 
heterogeneous voluntary and private sector actors. The MoJ is not uniquely privileged in 
commenting on Breaking the Cycle and the PbR pilots, but it is a powerful macro-actor, 
compared to weaker individual actors who publish their own comments and responses.  
 
The results of the PbR pilots at HMPs Peterborough and Doncaster were primarily 
determined and published by the MoJ (e.g. MoJ, 2013a), with analyses also provided by 
the independent assessors (e.g. Jolliffe and Hedderman, 2014). The MoJ's analytical team 
had privileged access to the baseline reconviction data and determined both the time 
frame across which reconviction events would be measured and the statistical levels at 
which the pilots were judged to have achieved 'results' (MoJ, 2011a: 33, 36, 37). The work 
of Social Finance in stimulating the Peterborough pilot and the work of all the 
heterogeneous actors involved was ultimately most powerfully represented and analysed 
by MoJ. The MoJ also became spokesperson for the prisoners in this translation, although 
their voices sounded only through statistics demonstrating reconviction rates (e.g. MoJ, 
2013a). It is notable that prisoners formed the link between all actors and were the object of 
this policy reform, yet remain entirely silent in the body of publications examined here, 
featuring only in terms of recidivism rates. Although prisoners retain their individual 
agency and capacity to resist participating in or engaging with programmes, here the 
negotiations between service providers entirely eclipsed the voices of those subject to the 
reforms.  
 
Nevertheless, heterogeneous actors from the public, private and voluntary sectors can and 
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do speak on their own behalf e.g. through their publications, press releases and reports, as 
detailed in the sample of voluntary organisation responses to the consultation above. 
Following the 2013 interim results, Catch 22 publicly congratulated the Doncaster pilot as 
“the first step in the right direction towards reducing re-offending through a caseworker-
led approach and a focus on improving outcomes”10. Similarly, St Giles Trust stated the 
results demonstrated “a huge endorsement”, showing the pilot is both “helping our clients 
turn their lives around and beginning to show savings for taxpayers by bringing down 
reoffending rates” (Pudelek, 2013: no pagination). St Giles “believes charities can play a 
bigger role in future criminal justice services” and remains “proud to be part of the first 
ever social impact bond” at HMP Peterborough (Owen, 2013: no pagination). In their most 
recent publication, St Giles speak of placing “much of our strategic focus” on “preparing 
and positioning ourselves to maximise the opportunities” that the Transforming 
Rehabilitation programme may offer (2014: 6-7).  
 
Other organisations published dissident responses and mounted a counter-enrollment 
strategy opposing the further marketisation of penal services. For example, comment 
pieces by The Howard League have opposed the spread of contracting-out and using PbR 
to pay contractors (Neilson, 2011; Neilson, 2009). It is notable that Social Finance (which 
initially suggested and secured funding for the Peterborough pilot) expressed dissidence 
towards the proposals in Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform (MoJ, 2013c). 
Social Finance publicly critiqued “the suggestion that the progress of the Peterborough 
Social Impact Bond supports the case for the Transforming Rehabilitation initiative” 
(Howard League, 2013: no pagination). Social Finance explained that “the success or 
otherwise of the Peterborough pilot is of limited relevance” to assessing the merits of the 
much wider changes envisaged by Transforming Rehabilitation, due to the unusual 
conditions of the pilot as explained above (Howard League, 2013: no pagination). 
Nevertheless, the following section explores how dissidence and Social Finance's 
withdrawal of support ultimately did not prevent the translation of PbR commissioning 
                                                 
10 See http://www.catch-22.org.uk/news/response-interim-results-pbr-pilot-hmp-doncaster/. Accessed 10/12/2013. 
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and the supervision requirement from policy into practice.  
 
Effects 
 
Drawing upon the externally-proposed Social Impact Bond, Breaking the Cycle interested 
and enrolled heterogeneous actors, including a small number of voluntary organisations, 
into further PbR pilots. The diverse inputs and discursive presence of these actors 
facilitated the pilots and were subsequently mobilised by the MoJ in the Transforming 
Rehabilitation programme, rolling out PbR to pay providers across penal services and 
introducing the supervision requirement. 
 
Breaking the Cycle stated the intention to roll out PbR across penal service commissioning 
by 2015 following pilots (MoJ, 2010: 11). Echoing the arguments of Breaking the Cycle, 
Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform emphasised that “stubbornly high 
reoffending rates” persist despite high penal spending (MoJ, 2013c: 3). Results for cohort 
one of the prison PbR pilots were not available until summer 2014, due to the time lag 
required to achieve a 12 month re-conviction measure (MoJ, 2013a: 1). Interim re-
conviction figures for these pilots were published in a 2013 ad-hoc MoJ statistical bulletin 
only due to “the high level of public interest in these pilots, particularly in relation to the 
reforms set out in” Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform (2013a: 1). These 
interim results illustrated falls in re-conviction events for both pilots, but were incomplete 
and not statistically significant (MoJ, 2013a: 5-6). The results remain “far from being 
complete”, with final Peterborough results not due until summer 2016 (MoJ, 2015a: 4). For 
the Doncaster pilot, the first cohort (October 2011 to September 2012) had a reoffending 
rate 5.7% lower than the 2009 baseline year, so the 5% PbR target was met. The second 
cohort (October 2012 to September 2013) was 3.3% lower than baseline, so the PbR target 
was not met (MoJ, 2015b: 2). The available results are modest, and based on voluntary 
rather than mandatory offender participation (MoJ, 2015b).  
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Despite modest results from the pilots and the Prison Reform Trust's faith “that 
government will harness the lessons and evidence of success before rolling out a payment 
by results scheme nationally” (2011: 3), the MoJ used Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy 
for Reform to reiterate (without substantive empirical 'results' or evidence) that PbR was the 
best means to reduce reoffending and achieve socio-economic benefits, stating: “to make 
the biggest impact on reoffending rates, we want to give new providers, incentivised 
under ‘payment by results’, responsibility for rehabilitating as many offenders as possible” 
(MoJ, 2013c: 20). As such, under this new payment mechanism, “the taxpayer will only 
pay providers in full for those services that actually deliver real reductions in reoffending” 
(MoJ, 2013c: 3). PbR is again presented as the sole mechanism to control penal spending 
and the sole solution to current failures of punishment: “only by doing this will we bear 
down on the long-term costs of the criminal justice system” (MoJ, 2013c: 3, emphasis 
added).  
 
In Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform, the MoJ at least acknowledged that the 
consultation delivered criticisms of the optimistic timetable for PbR implementation by 
2015, significantly before full results from PbR pilots became available (2013c: 33). 
However, the MoJ merely emphasised the urgency for reform, because “the need to reduce 
reoffending is pressing” (2013c: 33). They ambiguously stated that they “will take a 
measured approach to implementation” (MoJ, 2013c: 33) but reiterated that PbR contracts 
would commence from autumn 2014. This was presented as a necessary timescale because: 
“to achieve the reductions in reoffending rates we need, it is vital that we move ahead to 
put our new approach in place” (MoJ, 2013c: 33). Although concerns raised during 
consultation were at least acknowledged by the MoJ in this case, its position and 
implementation timescale remained unchanged.  
 
Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform also proposed that “statutory 
rehabilitation” be extended to short-sentence prisoners (MoJ, 2013c: 6). These prisoners 
were the object of the PbR pilots at HMPs Peterborough and Doncaster, which ran with 
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voluntary organisation involvement. Transforming Rehabilitation: A Strategy for Reform 
explained the need to support prisoners “through the prison gate” and deliver “mentoring 
and rehabilitation support to get their lives back on track so they do not commit crime 
again” (MoJ, 2013c: 3). This was deemed particularly important for “those released from 
short-sentences, who currently do not get support they need” to resettle in the community, 
having the highest reoffending rates yet “typically left to their own devices on release” 
(MoJ, 2013c: 4). The document signalled a continuing role for the voluntary sector in this 
work, noting that it: “has an important contribution to make in mentoring and turning 
offenders’ lives around” (MoJ, 2013c: 3).  
 
The PbR mechanism enabled the supervision requirement for short-sentence prisoners, 
funded by savings predicted from rolling out PbR for penal service providers (MoJ, 2013c: 
4). Notably, the need to reduce penal spending justified the introduction of PbR in Breaking 
the Cycle (MoJ, 2010: 8). Through the process of translation following Breaking the Cycle, an 
apparently natural link (Foucault, 1977: 232) was created between short-sentence 
prisoners, the need to supervise them in the community and the necessity of 
'rehabilitative' punishment delivered under PbR. The supervision requirement for short-
sentence prisoners represents a significant extension of penal control over this group, for 
whom there was previously no mandatory supervision.  
 
The supervision requirement was publicly welcomed by St Giles Trust (Owen, 2013). 
However, the Howard League and the Prison Reform Trust both expressed dissident 
responses and resisted these reforms, producing briefing papers for MPs and the Lords 
attempting to prevent passage of the Offender Rehabilitation Bill 2014. The Prison Reform 
Trust pointed out that the new supervision requirement will add a “further year to the 
ambit of the criminal justice system for all those sentenced to custody for any period of 
over one day and up to two years” (2013: 1). They explain its likely result of around 13,000 
offenders being recalled to custody and cost of £16 million year (Prison Reform Trust, 
2013: 1). As such, the Trust advocated further consideration of whether these proposals are 
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“fair and proportionate and whether the proposed new arrangements should be voluntary 
or mandatory” across short-sentence prisoners (2013: 1). Similarly, the Howard League 
noted that the supervision requirement will “result in a substantial increase in the number 
of short term prison sentences” and that “receptions to prison for breach or recall are 
already becoming one of the main drivers of the prison population” (Howard League, 
2013: no pagination). They argued that the supervision requirement could see Magistrates 
up-tariff and “sentence offenders to a prison sentence when a community sentence would 
be more appropriate in order that they will qualify for the 12 months of statutory 
rehabilitation on leaving custody” and noted the increased costs should this occur 
(Howard League, 2013: no pagination). As such, the Howard League recommend that 
“support for short sentenced prisoners ought to be voluntary” (2013: no pagination).  
 
These dissident responses may have contributed to Lord Beecham's proposed amendment 
to the Bill when it was considered in the House of Lords. The amendment suggested that 
changes to short-sentence offender supervision should be subject to an initial pilot. The 
issue went to a vote, resulting in a government win with 188 for and 209 against11. The 
passage of the Bill and adoption of PbR throughout the delivery of penal services, despite 
dissidence from voluntary organisations, demonstrate how a powerful actor can mobilise 
other actors to achieve its own ends and illustrate the potential downfalls of voluntary 
sector involvement with penal policy experiments. The final section considers the net-
widening effects of this translation.  
 
Discussion 
 
By mapping the translation that followed Breaking the Cycle, I demonstrate how voluntary 
organisations underpinned this translation, inventing the Social Impact Bond that 
stimulated the PbR pilots and facilitated the roll-out of PbR throughout penal service 
                                                 
11  See http://www.parliament.uk/business/news/2013/may/lords-offender-rehabilitation-bill/. Accessed 21/03/2014 
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contracting, creating cost savings to finance the supervision requirement. The MoJ's 
discursive voluntary sector and the voluntary organisations practically involved in the 
translation facilitated the supervision requirement, which represents a significant 
expansion in community control (Cohen, 1985: 15) to include the new group of short-
sentence prisoners. Without actually providing evidence of their utility, the pilots 
supported PbR and the supervision requirement. The involvement of voluntary 
organisations in these pilots and MoJ consultations enabled and justified the further 
marketisation and decentralisation of penal services using PbR and the expansion of 
control. Although some voluntary organisations actively displayed dissident reactions to 
these proposals, e.g. through responses to policy consultations and briefing papers 
regarding the new supervision legislation (e.g. Howard League, 2013; Prison Reform Trust, 
2013; Howard League, 2011), this dissidence was not powerful enough to counter the 
MoJ's multiple proposals, publications, pilots and position as spokesperson.  
 
The supervision requirement is problematic for three key reasons. First, it is predicted to 
significantly increase the scale of punishment, increasing the prison population and the 
costs thereof by increasing recalls to custody (without further offending) and causing up-
tariffing by magistrates (Howard League, 2013: no pagination; Prison Reform Trust, 2013: 
1). Historical precedents aiming to discipline less serious offenders illustrate how 
disciplinary reforms can increase the scale of penality. Echoing Breaking the Cycle's 
arguments about disciplining young offenders, the establishment of the penitentiary in the 
nineteenth century led to dramatic increases in the numbers imprisoned in England, 
through the apparent need to discipline petty offenders using the rules and regulations of 
the penitentiary, to prevent them proceeding “unimpeded to the commission of more 
dangerous offences” (Ignatieff, 1978: 28, 108). The establishment of probation in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century also increased the scale of punishment through the 
Summary Jurisdiction Act 1879, which enabled supervision for cases only “where the 
offences were thought so trifling as to make punishment unnecessary” (Jarvis, 1972: 10).  
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Second, recent reforms look set to expand punishment, by further fragmenting the legal 
power to punish and increasing the “army of technicians” involved in punishment 
(Foucault, 1977: 11). The decentralising proposals in Breaking the Cycle draw on “the 
expertise of everyone who can make a contribution” to improving public safety (MoJ, 
2010: 5). It is, however, questionable whether this represents progress towards more 
effective punishment and better public safety or rather, further fragmentation of the legal 
power to punish (away from the state) and increases in the scale of punishment (cf. 
Garland, 1990; Foucault, 1977). That is, whether the effect of involving a broader set of 
“providers from all sectors” (MoJ, 2010: 9) in competing for and delivering penal services 
is likely to be more effective punishment, or merely more punishment (cf. Cohen, 1985: 
254). Voluntary sector staff participation in PbR pilots and supervision for short-sentence 
prisoners can be equated to Foucault's subsidiary authorities of punishment and “minor 
civil servants of moral orthopaedics”, whose presence means that the penal system is 
“constantly growing” (Foucault, 1977: 10). 
 
Third, these reforms insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body 
(Ignatieff, 1978: xiii; Foucault, 1977: 82). The formerly automatic liberty afforded to short-
sentence prisoners following release now has more restrictions and conditions attached. 
The sentences of short-sentence prisoners therefore no longer end when they are released 
from prison and a “further year” has been added “to the ambit of the criminal justice 
system” (Prison Reform Trust, 2013: 1). Because short-sentence prisoners “currently do not 
get support they need” to resettle in the community (MoJ, 2013c: 3), a mandatory and 
coercive supervision requirement has been introduced. The continued liberty of short-
sentence prisoners post-release is now conditional upon their willingness and capacity to 
comply with the requirements of their supervision orders (cf. Cohen, 1985: 286). 
 
This paper adds to the limited empirical knowledge about voluntary organisations 
(Corcoran, 2011; Mills et al., 2011; Armstrong, 2002). It illustrates how voluntary sector 
involvement in penal policy can result in expanded penal control; and how apparently 
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inclusionary 'support' policies may mean that penal institutions remain, their remit is 
widened, intervention is intensified, control is extended and the net of carceral power is 
widened (cf. Cohen, 1985: 15, 286). The foundation of Breaking the Cycle was improving 
public safety, supporting prisoner resettlement and reducing the costs of punishment, but 
this translated into a mandatory coercive supervision requirement estimated to cost £16 
million annually. The expansion of penal power in this translation operated through 
voluntary sector involvement in the PbR pilots (cf. Carrabine, 2000: 319). Although these 
reforms were publicly opposed at every stage of the translation by other voluntary 
organisations, including the Prison Reform Trust and the Howard League, this dissent did 
not prevent the passage of the Offender Rehabilitation Act 2014 that enacted the supervision 
requirement and expanded the carceral power in space and time. The translation 
illustrates that the powerful labels of charity and voluntarism (Armstrong, 2002; 
Crawford, 1999) can be adopted by the machinery of government and utilised to support 
certain purposes. Dissident responses from voluntary organisations do not match the 
power or spokesperson capacity of the state. Quite simply, the state's machinery is larger 
and stronger.  
 
This analysis suggests that assuming beneficial outcomes such as empowerment and social 
capital (e.g. Bilby et al., 2013; Cohen, 2009; Lewis et al., 2007; Lippke, 2003) is problematic 
and demonstrates that the work of Cohen and Foucault inter alia remains highly relevant. 
However, a unilateral control 'effect' of voluntary organisations' work is neither presented 
nor inferred here for two reasons. First, the diversity of organisations within the sector and 
their varied relationships with the statutory agencies of punishment (e.g. lobbying, 
payment by results, contractual and informal relationships at different scales, such as with 
the MoJ and with individual prisons) means that one analysis certainly does not fit all.  
 
Whilst the empirical evidence base surrounding the penal voluntary sector remains 
lacking, this analysis also demonstrates that both the control and emancipatory literatures 
appear to be inadequate, so suggests that more nuanced hybrid or integrated theorisation 
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is required. The work of voluntary organisations can apparently result in both control and 
emancipation, or negative and positive effects. Without detracting from the utility and 
validity of control and netwidening theory, they tend to provide partial and limiting 
accounts which overlook variations in the substance and quality of the carceral net. 
 
Although the work of voluntary organisations is neither an uncomplicated good nor a 
panacea, the potential for such work to have beneficial outcomes should not be 
discounted. The interim results from the pilots must be viewed with extreme caution for 
the reasons outlined above, but they do indicate a fall in reconviction events (MoJ, 2013a: 
5-6) and there is some evidence that participants valued the opportunities provided (MoJ, 
2015b: 30). This reflects Lewis et al.'s study, which addressed British voluntary sector 
resettlement and mentoring Pathfinder projects with short-term prisoners transitioning 
into the community. It found offenders who had post-release contact with voluntary sector 
mentors “did significantly better than any other group of prisoners analysed” (Lewis et al., 
2007: 47). In follow-up interviews, over half of the participants indicated that the most 
beneficial aspect of the programme had been 'emotional support' or 'someone to talk to', 
which was cited almost four times as frequently as the next most common response: 'help 
with accommodation' (Lewis et al., 2007: 47). Clearly, the potential for voluntary sector 
programmes to expand the scale of penality must not be overlooked, but it seems that 
voluntary sector staff can also have agentic effects and build positive relationships with 
prisoners and probationers (Maguire, 2012; Mills et al., 2012; Neuberger, 2009; Lewis et al., 
2007). These relationships appear to be unique and valuable, although this should not be 
assumed and further evidence is certainly required to substantiate this. It is however 
possible that voluntary sector staff should not solely be equated to Foucault's subsidiary 
authorities of punishment (1977: 10).   
 
Desistance literature indicates that probation staff behaviours can confirm staff 
compassion and trustworthiness, and form the foundation upon which probationers will 
co-operate with services, commit to long-term compliance and take steps towards 
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desistance from crime (Phoenix and Kelly, 2013; McNeill, 2006). Whilst control and 
netwidening theories are valuable, they do not explain that a carceral net which enables 
and encourages those caught within will be experienced differently and lead to different 
outcomes from that which is, for example, disabling, violent and depressing. Although I 
would much prefer that short-sentence prisoners were offered resettlement support on a 
voluntary rather than mandatory basis, it is undeniable that short-sentence prisoners have 
high reoffending rates and are likely to experience difficulties (re-)integrating into the 
community post-release (MoJ, 2010).  
 
The most pressing question is, then, whether voluntary organisations' work must always 
expand control, and whether it may also have beneficial effects. If both statements are true, 
then we need to establish whether its beneficial effects can be greater, i.e. if it can help 
more than it hinders. If it can, we should explore the conditions under which beneficial 
outcomes can occur for prisoners and probationers. It may be that voluntary engagement 
is necessary, and it may be that informal relationships between voluntary organisations 
and smaller scale statutory entities (such as a single prison) are important. A significantly 
expanded base of empirical evidence could underpin theory accounting for hybrid 
experiences, e.g. by examining the characteristics and qualities of the carceral net as it 
operates and is experienced by different people, in different places and at different times 
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